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A CRITICAL LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF EQUAL 





by REGINALD C. OH• 
This Article contends that the linguistic structure of equal protection doctrine 
has played a major role in shaping and influencing its evolution and development. 
To show how linguistic structure shapes substantive legal discourse, this Article 
will examine a fundamental question that deals with equal protection law: when 
should the Court subject a law to heightened judicial scrutiny? Typically, when 
dealing with equal protection challenges to governmental action, the Court will 
generally defer to legislative judgment, presume the constitutionality of the 
legislation, and uphold the statute. However, under some circumstances, the Court 
will remove the presumption of constitutionality and subject certain legislation to 
rigorous, skeptical judicial scrutiny. 
In some cases, the Court has justified heightened judicial scrutiny of 
legislation whenever the government has employed a suspect classification; i.e., 
when the government has classified on the basis of a suspect trait. In other cases, 
the Court has contended that heightened judicial scrutiny is justified whenever the 
government enacts legislation that discriminates to the disadvantage of a suspect 
class. 
So, when does the Court apply heightened judicial scrutiny? Does it apply 
heightened scrutiny when a law employs a suspect classification, or does it apply 
heightened scrutiny when a law discriminates against a suspect class? However 
one answers that question, the curious thing is that, until recently, very few scholars 
or lawyers have asked critical questions about the differences between the terms 
suspect class and suspect classifications. Instead, courts, lawyers, and scholars 
have been prone to using the two terms interchangeably, implying that whether one 
describes equal protection doctrine either as the law of suspect classifications or as 
the law of suspect classes, it does not matter, since both terms presumably refer to 
the same theory. 
The thesis of this Article is that, even though courts, lawyers and scholars 
have failed to recognize the differences between the two terms, the actuality is that 
a suspect classification is substantively different from a suspect class. The term 
suspect classification refers to traits or characteristics, while the term suspect class 
refers to vulnerable political groups. 
Recent scholars are finally starting to recognize and to critically examine the 
differences between a theory of suspect classifications and a theory of suspect 
classes. Based upon their critical examination of equal protection doctrine, 
scholars contend that a dramatic shift in equal protection doctrine has occurred with 
little notice. Thus, Professor Jed Rubenfeld contends that, without any explicit 
ruling, the Court has transformed equal protection law from a doctrine of "suspect 
• Associate Professor, Appalachian School of Law. 
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classes" to a doctrine of"suspect classifications."' 
This Article accepts Professor Rubenfeld's conclusion that the law of equal 
protection today is a law of pure suspect classifications and not a law of suspect 
classes, and that the current formulation of equal protection law reflects the 
culmination of a dramatic doctrinal transformation. The equal protection doctrine 
was borne out of the judicial impulse to protect politically vulnerable groups like 
African-Americans from invidious laws that treated them as inferior, second-class 
citizens. However, under current equal protection, the Court is no longer 
concerned with protecting politically vulnerable groups from legislative harm. 
Rather, the Court is concerned solely with prohibiting governmental action that 
classifies on the basis of a suspect trait or characteristic. 
This Article will critically examine the emergence of the pure suspect 
classification theory of equal protection. Specifically, this Article will focus on the 
how question: how did an equal protection doctrine that developed out of concern 
for the protection of politically vulnerable groups become transformed into a 
doctrine that now considers that interest irrelevant to equal protection analysis? 
This Article will be divided into four parts. Part I will explain the differences 
between the terms suspect classification and suspect class. It will then show that 
scholars and the Court have conflated the two theories and have treated them as if 
they have the same substantive meaning. Part I will then argue that the terms 
suspect classifications and suspect classes refer to two substantively different 
theories of equal protection: a theory of suspect classifications focuses on 
prohibiting the government from classifying on the basis of certain traits, while a 
theory of suspect classes focuses on prohibiting the government from 
discriminating to the disadvantage of politically vulnerable groups. 
Part II will analyze the Court cases dealing with suspect class/classifications, 
and contend that the law of equal protection has always been concerned with the 
protection of suspect classes, but that in some cases, it has used and emphasized the 
language of suspect classes, while in other cases it has used and emphasized the 
language of suspect classifications. The case law can be divided into two 
categories. The first category includes those cases in which the Court justified 
heightened judicial scrutiny of laws only when the laws discriminated against a 
suspect class. Thus, under this theory, a law or classification would be considered 
presumptively invidious or suspect only when that classification was used to define 
and operate to the pebuliar disadvantage of a suspect class. This Part will argue 
I. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, !07 YALE L. REV. 427, 465 ( 1997) ("The shift 
from a smoking-out to a justificatory use of strict scrutiny parallels a more obvious shift in the Court's 
equal protection jurisprudence: from classes to classifications."); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, 
"Unexplainable On Grounds Other Than Race": The Inversion ofPrivilege and Subordination In Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 699 (2003) ("The Court's equal protection doctrine 
contains numerous 'departures' from 'substantive' and 'procedural' standards like the class-to­
classification and classification-to-class shifts."); Julie A. Nice, Equal Protection's Antinomies and the 
Promise ofa Co-Constitutive Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1392, 1400 (2000) ('The fifth antinomy 
represents a particularly strange turn in equal protection doctrine-the shift from protecting classes of 
people who suffer prejudice, such as African Americans or females, to prohibiting any use of 
classifications, such as race or sex, thus extending protection to dominant classes that historically have 
not suffered prejudice ...."). 
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that the suspect class theory of equal protection is more consistent with the spirit 
and principle of equal protection doctrine that developed out of the concerns for 
racial justice and equality underlying the Brown v. Board ofEducation2 decision. 
The second category includes those cases in which the Court began to justify 
heightened judicial scrutiny of laws primarily by focusing on the special nature of a 
particular classifying trait. However, even in these cases, while using the language 
of suspect classifications, an analysis of their reasoning shows that the Court still 
ultimately justified heightened judicial scrutiny only when a politically vulnerable 
group commanded extraordinary attention from the majoritarian political process. 
In other words, while using the language of suspect classifications, the Court in 
these cases was still primarily concerned about protecting suspect classes. 
Part III will contend that, at least with regard to cases dealing with race and 
affirmative ac,tion, the Court has eliminated suspect class analysis and adopted an 
equal protection law of pure suspect classifications. A theory of pure suspect 
classifications justifies heightened judicial scrutiny based solely on the suspect 
nature of certain traits or characteristics, with no reference or concern at all for the 
protection ofpolitically vulnerable groups. Under this theory, certain traits are 
suspect, because there is something inherent in the nature of traits such as race and 
gender that make them susceptible for invidious use by the government, and not 
because such traits are used to discriminate to the peculiar disadvantage of 
politically vulnerable groups. This Part will examine the Regents of University of 
California v. Davis,3 Richmond v. Croson, 4 and Adarand v. Pena5 decisions to show 
how, through the affirmative action cases, the Court developed its current equal 
protection theory of pure suspect classifications. A pure suspect classification 
analysis made it much easier for the Court to justify strict scrutiny of race­
conscious affirmative action programs, because the Court was able to avoid having 
to declare whites as a suspect class in order to justify heightened judicial protection 
of white political interests. 
Part IV will discuss some of the linguistic implications in my analysis. First, 
this Part will explain the theory of critical or meta-linguistics, a field of language 
study that contends that the structure of language embodies particular views about 
the nature of reality. This Part will then contend that the linguistic structure of the 
terms suspect classification and suspect class help to explain the doctrinal shifting 
between suspect class and suspect classification analyses, and to explain how the 
Court ultimately adopted an equal protection law ofpure suspect classifications. In 
short, the move to a pure suspect classification analysis reflects the Court's 
commitment to an Aristotelian essentialist view of reality, and the linguistic 
structure of the term suspect classification actually embodies that essentialist view. 
Second, this Part will argue that the linguistic conflation of the terms suspect 
class and suspect classification facilitated the Court's silent transformation of equal 
protection doctrine. This Article, thus, is a call for the development of a critical 
linguistic analysis of law, an analysis that focuses on how courts rely on linguistic 
2. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
3. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
4. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
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techniques to make invisible yet significant changes in legal doctrine. 
I. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS VERSUS SUSPECT CLASSES IN EQUAL 
PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
Scholars contend that there has been a dramatic transformation of equal 
protection doctrine. In light of the Court's recent affirmative action cases, 
Professor Rubenfeld argues that "today's strict scrutiny doctrine can no longer be 
organized, and is no longer organized, around the concept of suspect classes. It is 
organized instead around the concept of suspect classifications-a momentous, if 
often unnoticed, shift."6 If, as Professor Rubenfeld argues, the shift from class to 
classification analysis represents a dramatic substantive transformation of equal 
protection doctrine, the question arises, why has this dramatic shift gone largely 
unnoticed? This Article contends that the linguistic confusion between the very 
similar terms suspect class and suspect classifications has played a role in 
facilitating the largely invisible transformation of equal protection doctrine. This 
Part will explain the differences between class and classification analysis, and show 
how the Court and scholars have typically conflated the two concepts together. 
A. The Doctrine ofSuspect Classes 
Under the doctrine of suspect classes, a law will be subject to heightened 
scrutiny only if the law can be shown to "operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class."7 A social group will be considered "suspect" if it suffers from the 
traditional indicia of suspectness: whether a class is saddled with disabilities, 
whether it has been subject to a history of unequal treatment, whether the group has 
been relegated to "position[s] of political powerlessness as to command 
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."8 If a group fails 
to meet the traditional indicia of suspectness, the group will be considered a non­
suspect class, and laws discriminating against them will be subject to deferential 
rational basis review. 
The term "suspect class," therefore, refers to a historically situated social 
group that has been disadvantaged and invidiously discriminated against in the 
political process.9 When the Court talks about suspect classes, it is not referring to 
traits or characteristics, but instead it is referring to social groups, like racial 
minorities, women, the poor, and the disabled. 10 Specifically, the Court is referring 
to historically situated social groups who have been subject to a history of 
6. Jed Rubenfeld, The New Unwritten Constitution, 51 DUKE L.J. 289, 301 (2001). 
7. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 2I6-17 ("Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those 
classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class,' or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental 
right.' With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce the mandate of equal protection 
by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a 
compelling governmental interest."). 
8. San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411U.S.1, 28 (1973). 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
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prejudicial and hostile treatment. I I 
B. The Doctrine ofSuspect Classifications 
The problem with referring to the law of equal protection as the doctrine of 
suspect classes is that the Court has also sometimes referred to equal protection 
doctrine as the doctrine of suspect classifications, and not as the doctrine of suspect 
classes. I2 Under the doctrine of suspect classifications, when a court is dealing 
with an equal protection challenge to a law, it must first determine whether a 
challenged law employs a suspect or a non-suspect classification. I3 A legislation 
that relies on a suspect classification, like "race," will be subject to strict scrutiny 
review.I 4 Under strict scrutiny review, a legislative classification will be upheld 
only if the classification is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state 
interest. Is In contrast, when a non-suspect classification is challenged as a violation 
of equal protection, courts will use the lowest level of scrutiny, the rational basis 
test, to analyze the constitutionality of the law. I6 With regard to non-suspect 
classifications, courts will generally give the legislature wide deference and uphold 
the law unless it can be shown to be irrational or enacted for an illegitimate 
purpose.t7 
Under equal protection analysis, the critical inquiry for the Court is to 
determine if the state has enacted a suspect as opposed to a non-suspect 
classification. All laws classify on some basis, but the Court will treat only laws 
that classify on the basis of certain traits or characteristics as suspect. I8 Under 
current equal protection law, the Court has held that traits such as race, national 
origin, alienage, gender, and illegitimacy are suspect classifications subject to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. I9 
11. Id.; see also United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (analyzing 
the theory ofjudicial review). 
12. Compare Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (stating that racial classifications should be treated as 
suspect) with Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982) (arguing that classifications disadvantaging 
suspect classes must serve a compelling government interest). 
13. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (explaining the equal protection doctrine and explaining that 
when the doctrine is applied to race, the means must fit a compelling goal); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
I, 11 ( 1967) ("At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications ... be 
subjected to the 'most rigid scrutiny."'). 
14. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) ("Racial and ethnic 
distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."). 
15. Adarand, 515 U.S. at235. 
16. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that legislation 
will be considered valid when it is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). 
17. See id. ("When social or economic legislation is at issue, the Equal Protection Clause allows the 
States wide latitude."). 
18. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 145-70 
(Camille Smith ed., 1980) (analyzing traits and characteristics that should be considered "suspect" for 
purposes of equal protection analysis). 
19. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41. Race, national origin, and alienage classifications are subject 
to strict scrutiny. Gender and illegitimacy classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
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C. Confusing the Terms Suspect Classification and Suspect Class 
The question arises, what is the law of equal protection? When should the 
Court apply heightened judicial scrutiny? Should it apply heightened scrutiny 
when a law employs a suspect classification, or should it apply heightened scrutiny 
when a law discriminates against a suspect class? And, perhaps more importantly, 
does it even matter whether we describe equal protection doctrine either as the law 
of suspect classifications or as the law of suspect classes? 
The differences between a law of suspect classes and a law of suspect 
classifications matter, because the two theories reflect fundamentally different 
theories of equality: the law of suspect classes is more consistent with the anti­
caste or anti-subordination theory of equal protection,20 while the law of suspect 
classifications is more consistent with the anti-classification or anti-differentiation 
theory of equal protection.21 
Thus, a law of suspect classes, in order to prevent the subordination of groups, 
focuses on protecting politically vulnerable groups such as African-Americans and 
women from invidious treatment by the government. A law of suspect 
classifications, on the other hand, focuses on prohibiting the government from 
classifying on the basis of certain traits like race or gender. 
However, the importance of the differences between the suspect classes and 
suspect classifications doctrines is an issue that, up until recently, has not been 
critically examined by scholars, in part because lawyers, the courts, and scholars 
often conflate the two terms and treat them as if they referred to the same 
doctrine.22 Moreover, the substantive differences between the two theories are a 
reflection of the different linguistic structures underlying the two theories, as will 
be explained further in Part IV of this Article. 
If, as this Article contends, the difference between a theory of suspect 
classifications and a theory of suspect classes reflects meaningful, substantive 
differences, then the fact that scholars and courts have tended to treat the two terms 
as if they meant the same thing becomes puzzling. One possible explanation for 
the conflation of the two terms is rather simple: the two terms are virtually the 
same words, and the two terms are obviously interrelated. Thus, a suspect 
20. See Hutchinson, supra note 1, at 622 (arguing that anti-subordination principle emphasizes "the 
impact of governmental actions upon historically subordinated groups"). 
21. See id. at 620-21 (arguing antidifferentiation principle treats classifications on the basis of race 
as presumptively unconstitutional). 
22. See, e.g., Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discriminating, 
Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 937, 939-40 (1991) (using "suspect class" and "suspect 
classification" interchangeably); Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 107, 108-09 (1990) (describing courts' use of "suspect classifications" to determine 
equal protection violations and then describing "suspect classes" as disadvantaged groups in society); 
Jennifer E. Watson, When No Place is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve Suspect Classification, 88 
IOWA L. REV. 501, 510 (2003) (describing Rodriguez as coming up with the standards of a suspect class 
and deciding that poverty was not a suspect classification). Moreover, during an informal discussion 
over lunch of the suspect class versus suspect classification issue, I asked several professors of 
constitutional law whether they typically used those terms interchangeably. They all answered yes, 
stating that, generally, many constitutional law professors do not make any significant analytic 
distinctions between those two terms. 
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classification like race is related to a suspect class like African-Americans, because 
race is the trait that defines the class or group African-Americans. However, even 
though clearly the trait race is different from the group African-Americans defined 
by that trait, an examination of scholarly analysis of suspect classes and suspect 
classifications shows the tendency for scholars to mix up traits and groups, treating 
traits as if they were the same thing as social groups/classes of people. 
For example, Professor Thomas Simon in his article, Suspect Class 
Democracy: A Social Theory, asserts that he wants to analyze equal protection 
doctrine by examining the role of "suspect classes, i.e., disadvantaged groups, in a 
democratic system."23 However, while talking about which groups in society ought 
to be treated as suspect classes, he then states that, "Race, alienage, ancestry, and to 
a lesser extent, gender and illegitimacy constitute the other accepted suspect 
classes, "24 and that "[ o ]f the many candidates for suspect class status, only four 
have qualified: race, gender, alienage, and illegitimacy."25 
The problem with Professor Simon's analysis is that it does not make much 
sense to talk about "race" as a "suspect class," if by suspect class he is referring to 
"disadvantaged groups" in democratic society. "Race" does not refer to any 
particular, historically situated social group, but rather it refers to a "trait" that we 
ascribe to people. The term "gender" also does not refer to any particular 
historically disadvantaged group in society. Women, on the other hand, may be a 
disadvantaged group in society, but "gender" is merely an abstraction, a term we 
use to describe a trait or characteristic of human beings. 26 Thus, when Simon talks 
about "race" as a suspect class, what he really means to say is that the trait "race" is 
generally treated in the law as a "suspect classification." Likewise, when he writes 
about "gender" as a suspect class, what he really means is that the trait "gender" is 
generally treated in the law as a suspect classification. 
Similarly, Professor Peter Rubin, in an important article re-examining the 
purposes of equal protection, conflates the terms suspect classification and suspect 
class.27 In his discussion of the Court's suspect classification doctrine, he observes 
that "[t]he Supreme Court has never provided a clear explanation of the concept of 
suspectness, but it has taken the approach that certain abstract characteristics of 
particular classes render constitutionally suspect laws that disadvantage members 
of those classes."28 He then goes on to identify the various criteria used by the 
Court to explain why certain abstract characteristics like race or gender should be 
considered suspect: 
23. Simon, supra note 22, at I 09. 
24. Id. at 133. 
25. Id. at 111. 
26. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 ("Legislative classifications based on gender also call for a 
heightened standard of review. That factor generally provides no sensible ground for differential 
treatment. 'What differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical 
disability ... is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute 
to society."' (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)). 
27. Peter Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny 
After Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PENN. L. REV. I, 15-16 (2000). 
28. Id. at 16. 
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Among the relevant criteria identified in Court decisions have been 
"discrete[ness] and insular[ity]," inability to compete on an equal footing 
in the political process, possession of "obvious, immutable or 
distinguishing characteristics" essentially irrelevant to the purpose for 
which a government decision is made, "status of birth" for which the 
individual bears no responsibility, a history of "prejudice" or 
"discrimination" against the group in question, and the risk of stigma or 
stereotype.29 
In his list of relevant criteria for suspectness, however, he fails to separate out 
criteria used to determine whether a classification ought to be treated suspect from 
criteria used to determine whether a class or group ought to be treated as suspect. 
For example, the criteria status of birth over which the individual bears no 
responsibility refers to the nature of a characteristic like gender. One's gender is 
something which a person does not have control over because he or she is born 
with a gender. However, a history ofprejudice or discrimination against the group 
in question does not describe the nature of a characteristic or trait. A trait like 
gender does not suffer from a history of prejudice or discrimination. Rather, it is 
the class or group of women who suffers from a history of prejudice and 
discrimination. 
In treating the criteria to determine whether a class or group should be 
considered suspect as if they were the same as the criteria to determine whether a 
trait or characteristic should be considered suspect, Professor Rubin effectively 
implies that two analyses are the same-that the same criteria can be used to 
determine both the suspectness of a classification and of a class, because 
presumably a suspect classification is the same thing as a suspect class. 
D. Suspect Class and Suspect Classification Analyses as Two Different Theories of 
Equal Protection 
Scholars tend to conflate the two terms because the Court itself has never 
clearly differentiated between suspect classes and suspect classifications, and as a 
result, the Court has employed the use of both terms in ways that suggest that 
Justices do not fully understand how they are using the terms. An example of the 
Court's confusion is illustrated by its opinion in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center.30 The central issue in Cleburne was whether laws that classify on 
the basis of mental retardation should be subject to heightened judicial scrutiny. In 
Cleburne, the Court began its opinion by discussing the special nature of suspect 
classifications, and then, without any explanation, it then jumped into a discussion 
of suspect classes in ultimately holding that "mental retardation is not a quasi­
suspect classification calling for a more exacting standard ofjudicial review than is 
normally accorded economic and social legislation."31 
In Cleburne, the Court conducted a review of precedent and discussed at 
29. Id. 
30. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
31. Id. at 442. 
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length the rationales given for treating certain traits like race, national origin, 
alienage, gender and illegitimacy as suspect.32 In discussing the "suspect" nature of 
racial, alienage, and gender classifications, the Court derived three factors from 
prior case Jaw as factors to use in determining whether Jaws classifying on the basis 
of a certain trait ought to be deemed constitutionally suspect. The first factor is 
whether the trait is "so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state 
interest that Jaws grounded in such consideration are deemed to reflect prejudice 
and antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or 
deserving as others."33 The Court reasoned that a person's race is a factor that is 
rarely relevant to the achievement of any legitimate government interest. 
The second factor to consider in determining whether a trait should be 
considered suspect is whether the trait is one that is beyond a person's control. 
Thus, because race, sex, and illegitimacy are traits that individuals possess by 
virtue of birth and not by virtue of one's choices or achievements, the Court 
suggests that Jaws that assign benefits and burdens on the basis of those traits are 
unfair and immoral. 
The third factor is whether a trait frequently bears "no relation to ability to 
perform or contribute to society."34 The Court reasoned that a suspect trait like sex 
does not reflect a person's abilities, while a trait like intelligence does serve as a 
reasonable and legitimate proxy for a person's abilities.35 Similarly, the Court 
explained that "[b]ecause illegitimacy is beyond the individual's control and bears 
'no relation to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society,' 
official discrimination resting on that characteristic is also subject to somewhat 
heightened review. "36 
The central principle underlying the Court's analysis of suspect traits or 
classifications is the concept of presumptive irrelevancy, which is the notion that 
there are certain traits that as a general matter are irrelevant to governmental 
decision-making. Thus, if a trait such as race bears no relation to one's ability to 
perform and is also beyond a person's control, then the assumption is that when 
government classifies on the basis of such a trait, it probably has no reasonable or 
legitimate reason for doing so. 
After having explained at length why the Court treats certain traits as 
constitutionally suspect, the Court then turned to explain why mental retardation is 
not a suspect classification like race, gender, or illegitimacy. In its explanation, the 
Court did examine the nature of the trait mental retardation, and concluded that it 
is a trait that is presumptively relevant to governmental decision-making.37 
However, most of the Court's analysis did not focus on the nature of mental 
retardation, but instead on the political and historical situation of the class or group 
of the mentally retarded to conclude that the mentally retarded are not a discrete 
32. Id. at 442 - 47. 
33. Id. at 441. 
34. Id. (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411U.S.677, 686 (1973)). 
35. Id. at 440 - 41. 
36. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441. 
37. Id. at 446. 
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and insular minority or a suspect class.38 
First, the Court contended that the mentally retarded are not "political[ly] 
powerless" because they have been able to successfully lobby legislatures to enact 
legislation protective of their rights.39 As a group able to protect its interests 
through the legislative process, the Court reasoned that the group's political 
strength diminished the need for judicial intervention on their behalf. Second, the 
Court also reasoned that declaring the "large and amorphous class of the mentally 
retarded" as a quasi-suspect class would open the floodgates for other similarly 
large and amorphous classes or groups like "the aging, the disabled, the mentally 
ill, and the infirm"40 to be declared suspect classes as well. Third, the Court 
acknowledged a history of invidious discrimination against the mentally retarded, 
but reasoned that such a history alone does not justify labeling them as a suspect 
class.41 
In its opinion, the Cleburne Court did not give any indication that it was 
shifting from a discussion of suspect classifications to suspect classes, and 
effectively treated those two terms as if they were the same concept.42 In fact, the 
Court's opinion suggests that it was not even conscious of having made that shift. 
What is going on here? Is the equal protection doctrine a doctrine of suspect 
classifications or suspect classes? The answer is that it has been both. In short, the 
Court has required an analysis into whether a classification disadvantages a suspect 
class to determine whether it should treat a classification as "suspect," thereby 
triggering strict scrutiny of the suspect legislative classification.43 
II. THE DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS 
This Part will analyze the Court cases dealing with suspect 
class/classifications, and contend that the law of equal protection has always 
reflected a commitment to the protection of suspect classes, even if it has not 
always been consistent with its language. For example, in some cases, the Court 
has used and emphasized the language of suspect classes, while in other cases it has 
used and emphasized the language of suspect classifications. The case law can be 
divided into two categories. The first category includes those cases in which the 
Court justified heightened judicial scrutiny of laws only when the laws 
discriminated against a suspect class. Thus, under this theory, a law or 
classification would be considered presumptively invidious or suspect only when 
that classification was used to define and operate to the peculiar disadvantage of a 
suspect class. This Part will argue that the suspect class theory of equal protection 
is more consistent with the spirit and principle of equal protection doctrine that 
developed out of the concerns for racial justice and equality underlying the Brown 
38. Id. at 445. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 445-46. 
41. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446. 
42. Id. at 442-47. 
43. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 (explaining that a classification against a suspect class should be 
narrowly tailored and serve a compelling government interest). 
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v. Board ofEducation decision.44 
The second category includes those cases in which the Court began to justify 
heightened judicial scrutiny of laws primarily by focusing on the special nature of a 
particular classifying trait. In these cases, the Court began to articulate what this 
Article calls a pure suspect classification theory of equal protection. Under a pure 
suspect classifications theory, the equal protection clause is solely concerned with 
prohibiting the use of certain classifying traits, with no regard for the protection of 
suspect classes. However, even in these cases, while using the language of suspect 
classifications, the Court still ultimately justified heightened judicial scrutiny in 
terms of protecting politically vulnerable groups. In other words, while using the 
language of suspect classifications, the Court was still primarily concerned about 
protecting suspect classes. 
A. The Original Understanding ofSuspect Class Analysis 
As Professor Jed Rubenfeld contends, "[t]he tiered framework of equal 
protection review originally developed not with the notion of "suspect 
classifications," but with the recognition of "suspect classes."45 However, while 
Professor Rubenfeld may be correct in terms of the substantive change in equal 
protection law, his statement is inaccurate to the extent it implies that the Court has 
never used the language of suspect classifications until recently. Rather, in their 
opinions, the Court has for some time used both the language of suspect classes and 
suspect classifications. Thus, to be more accurate, under what this Article and 
Professor Rubenfeld calls "suspect class" analysis, the Court will subject a law to 
heightened scrutiny only when the legislature (1) enacts a suspect classification, 
and (2) that suspect classification disadvantages a suspect class. As the Court 
asserted in Plyler v. Doe: "[W]e have treated as presumptively invidious [i.e., 
suspect] those classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class. "'46 
Con~titutional scholars clearly understood that the suspect or presumptively 
invidious nature of a classification was triggered only when the classification was 
being used to disadvantage a suspect class.47 As Professor John Hart Ely asserts, 
"[r]acial classifications that disadvantage minorities are 'suspect' because we 
suspect they are the product of racially prejudiced thinking of a sort we understand 
the Fourteenth Amendment to have been centrally concerned with eradicating."48 
The suspect class theory of equal protection is one that originated from the 
theory ofjudicial review explicated in United States v. Carotene Products Footnote 
Four.49 Based on the Carolene Products theory, courts would strictly scrutinize 
legislatively enacted "suspect classifications" that burdened the rights of a 
44. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
45. Rubenfeld, supra note 1, at 465. 
46. Id. at 216. 
47. See generally ELY, supra note 16, at 145-70 (stating that Supreme Court Justices examine 
specific groups before assigning them a particular level of scrutiny). 
48. Id. at 243 n.11 (emphasis added). 
49. Carotene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4; see generally Robert M. Cover, The Origins of 
Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287, 1290-1309 (1982) (analyzing 
Footnote Four's theory ofjudicial review). 
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vulnerable group or a "suspect class."50 Historically, of course, the reason why 
courts were required to be protective of suspect classes on an ongoing basis is 
because courts were seeking to dismantle a system of hierarchical social relations 
between whites and blacks in the Jim Crow South.51 Courts were engaging in an 
attempt to reconstruct the South and eliminate the system of race relations with its 
roots in slavery. 
B. The Doctrinal Development ofSuspect Class Analysis 
While the Brown line of cases struck down Jim Crow segregation laws under 
equal protection during the 1950s and 1960s, the Court did not explicitly explain 
why it engaged in skeptical judicial scrutiny of laws that discriminated against 
racial minorities until it decided a series of cases in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. 
In a series of cases decided in the 1970s, the Court dealt with cases in which it had 
to decide whether laws disadvantaging other groups besides racial minorities ought 
to be deemed suspect. Through these decisions, the Court began to explicitly 
develop its theory of suspect class equal protection. 
In Graham v. Richardson, the Court relied on suspect class analysis to hold 
that laws that discriminate against aliens should be subject to strict scrutiny.52 
Although the Court did not explicitly use the term "suspect class," the Court 
summarily concluded that "[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a 'discrete and 
insular' minority" for whom heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate.53 
In 1973, two years after Graham, the Court, in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, for 
the first time used the language and theory of suspect classes, ultimately concluding 
that the poor are not a suspect class. In reaching its holding, the Court provided an 
in-depth discussion of the role that "suspect class" analysis plays in determining 
whether a classification disadvantaging a group ought to be considered suspect and, 
therefore, subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.54 Although the Rodriguez Court 
relied on both the language of suspect class and suspect classification, its reasoning 
clearly emphasized the central role of suspect class analysis in determining the 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. Specifically, without being explicit about the 
connection, the Court reasoned that any attempt to determine whether a 
classification ought to be considered suspect must necessarily entail an 
examination into the nature and identity of the class or group that is being 
disadvantaged by a particular classification. 
In Rodriguez, the Court dealt with an equal protection challenge to the State of 
Texas' public school funding scheme. The Court began its opinion by framing the 
issue in suspect class terms: "[w]e must decide, first, whether the Texas system of 
50. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-17 ("With respect to such classifications, it is appropriate to enforce 
the mandate of equal protection by requiring the State to demonstrate that its classification has been 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."). 
51. Cover, supra note 47, at 1300-04 (analyzing the pervasive pattern of oppression against African 
Americans justifying the need for special judicial protection of their rights and interests). 
52. 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
53. Id. at 372. 
54. 411 U.S. at 17-29. 
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financing public education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class ... 
thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny. "55 
The Court asserted that there were three ways to frame the issue in Rodriguez. 
To determine if the state of Texas's public school finance scheme ought to be 
subject to heightened equal protection scrutiny because wealth is a suspect 
classification, the Court stated that the Texas system "might be regarded as 
discriminating (1) against 'poor' persons whose incomes fall below some 
identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally 
'indigent,' or (2) against those who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against 
all those who, irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in relatively 
poorer school districts. "56 The Court then asserted that, "[ o ]ur task must be to 
ascertain whether, in fact, the Texas system has been shown to discriminate on any 
of these possible bases and, if so, whether the resulting classification may be 
regarded as suspect."57 
The Court, however, refused to subject the Texas school financing scheme to 
heightened judicial scrutiny, because it held that "[t]he Texas system does not 
operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class."58 The Court then 
articulated three factors to determine if a class is suspect and concluded that the 
poor did not meet the indicia of suspectness: 
the system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not 
saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of 
purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of 
political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection 
from the majoritarian political process.59 
Only after first asserting that the poor are not a suspect class did the Court 
then conclude that therefore there was no reason for it to be suspicious of any 
resulting wealth classification. In other words, the Court reasoned that the only 
reason to be suspicious of a wealth classification is if it was operating to the 
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. The Court rejected the notion that 
classifying on the basis of wealth alone could make wealth classifications suspect, 
noting that it had "never heretofore held that wealth discrimination alone provides 
an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny ...."60 The Court interpreted its 
earlier case law and concluded that earlier dealing with the rights of indigents did 
not create an absolute presumption that a wealth classification automatically 
triggered heightened scrutiny.61 Rather, the Court emphasized that in determining if 
a wealth classification should be subject to heightened scrutiny, an analysis into 
55. Id.atl7. 
56. Id. at 19-20. 
57. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
58. Id. at 28. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 29. 
61. Id. at 26. 
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whether a suspect class was being disadvantaged and the nature of that 
disadvantage or deprivation was required.62 
While a strong argument could be made that the poor should indeed be treated 
as a suspect class, the crucial point is that the Court clearly linked the suspectness 
of a classification with whether it has been used to disadvantage a suspect class. 
Similarly, the Court in Massachusetts Board ofRetirement v. Murgia63 used 
suspect class analysis to hold that laws that discriminate against the aged ate not 
suspect. In Murgia, a class of police officers forced to retire upon turning fifty 
years old challenged the constitutionality of a state mandatory retirement law. The 
threshold question for the Court was whether age discrimination should be treated 
as constitutionally suspect. In conducting its analysis, the Court returned to the 
language of suspect classes to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny, stating 
that "equal protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification 
only when the classification impermissibly . . . operates to the peculiar 
disadvantage of a suspect class. "64 
The Court then rejected the contention that "a class of uniformed state police 
officers over 50" constitutes a suspect class.65 It reasoned that the aged have not 
experienced a history of purposeful unequal treatment like "those who have been 
discriminated on the basis of race or national origin,"66 and the aged have not been 
"subjected to unique disabilities based on the basis of stereotyped characteristics 
not truly indicative of their abilities."67 Finally, the Court reasoned that old age 
does not define or create a "'discrete and insular group' in need of 'extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process. "'68 Rather, old age simply 
"marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal life span."69 
C. The Doctrinal Development ofPure Suspect Classification Analysis 
While the Court was developing its doctrine of suspect classes, 
simultaneously, it was also beginning to develop an alternative theory of 
heightened judicial review: the doctrine ofpure suspect classifications. A theory of 
pure suspect classifications is one that justifies heightened judicial scrutiny based 
solely on the suspect nature of certain traits or characteristics, with no reference or 
concern at all for politically vulnerable groups. Under this theory, certain traits 
such as race and gender are suspect, because there is something inherent in their 
nature that makes them susceptible for invidious use by the government, and not 
because such traits are used to discriminate to the peculiar disadvantage of 
politically vulnerable groups. 
While the doctrine of pure suspect classifications did not fully emerge until 
62. Id. at 20 (noting that earlier cases in which wealth classifications were deemed suspect 
emphasized that indigents suffered an absolute deprivation of state benefit). 
63. 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
64. Id. at 312. 




69. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14. 
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the Court's decisions in Croson and Adarand, several earlier equal protection cases 
include language and reasoning which laid the groundwork for the eventual 
emergence of a pure suspect classification equal protection analysis.70 However, 
even though these earlier equal protection cases relied on the language of pure 
suspect classification, there are aspects of those opinions which clearly show a firm 
commitment to the theory of protecting suspect classes. 
In Loving v. Virginia,7 1 the Court used the language of suspect classifications 
in subjecting anti-miscegenation laws to strict scrutiny. The Court noted that 
Virginia's criminal prohibitions against interracial marriage "rest "solely upon 
distinctions drawn according to race. "72 The Court, without any reference to 
politically vulnerable groups, then reasoned that that act of drawing racial 
distinctions or classifications, by itself, is "odious to a free people whose 
institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."73 Accordingly, the Court 
concluded that, under the Equal Protection Clause, "racial classifications, especially 
suspect in criminal statutes, [must] be subjected to the most 'rigid scrutiny."'74 
In Loving, probably for strategic reasons, the Court relied heavily on the 
language of pure suspect classification analysis. In Loving, the State argued that 
the law did not violate equal protection because it prohibited both whites and 
blacks from marrying someone of another race. Loving, therefore, does not neatly 
fit into the suspect class approach to equal protection, since the law arguably 
violated the equal protection rights of a nonsuspect class as well as of a suspect 
class. Thus, to protect the rights of whites seeking to marry with persons of other 
races, the Court did so by resorting to suspect classification analysis, emphasizing 
that the act of classifying on the basis of race, regardless of whether that act 
burdens the rights of a suspect class or not, should still be subject to strict judicial 
scrutiny. 
However, the case did not completely reflect a commitment to the pure 
suspect classification approach, because the Court empha,sized that the law 
ultimately was unconstitutional because it reflected a desire to advance white 
supremacy, and by logic, to further the inferiority of racial minorities.75 Moreover, 
in Loving, arguably the law really did disadvantage a suspect class-if that class is 
defined as the class of interracial couples seeking to marry. Thus, despite its 
reliance on suspect classification analysis, the Loving decision still represented a 
70. From a chronological standpoint, the Court actually used the language of suspect classifications 
before it began to use the language of suspect classes. However, as this Article contends, the equal 
protection doctrine developing out of Brown were suspect class cases in principle if not in name. The 
likely reason that the Court in its earlier equal protection cases never had to explicitly deem African 
Americans and other racial minorities a suspect class is because that conclusion was an obvious one, 
particularly since the Court in Carotene Products asserted that racial minorities are a paradigmatic 
example of a discrete and insular minority. 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. 
71. 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
74. Id. (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
75. Id. ("The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons 
demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to 
maintain White Supremacy."). 
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firm commitment to protecting suspect classes from invidious laws. 
The next equal protection case to rely heavily on the language of suspect 
classifications was Frontiero v. Richardson,76 a case in which the Court had to 
determine whether it should subject laws that discriminate against women to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. A plurality of the Court held that sex or gender is a 
suspect classification which must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Curiously, 
in holding that gender is a suspect classification, the Court never cited to Rodriguez 
nor did it examine the Rodriguez factors to determine if women constitute a suspect 
class. The Court did justify heightened judicial scrutiny by referring to the history 
of discrimination against women and by comparing the historical status of women 
to blacks during slavery,77 and it noted that gender classifications have "the effect 
of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without 
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members."78 Moreover, it did 
recognize that, because of the "high visibility of the sex characteristic, women still 
face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination in our educational 
institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most conspicuously, in the political 
arena."79 
However, the Court in Frontiero never explicitly declared women a suspect 
class, instead focusing primarily on the nature of the sex trait to justify declaring 
sex as a suspect classification. The Court reasoned that sex, as a highly visible 
characteristic like race and national origin, is "an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities 
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to 'violate 
the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to 
individual responsibility. "'80 
The reason the Court probably did not explicitly deem women a suspect class 
is that women present a problem to suspect class analysis because they are a 
numerical majority ~nd therefore do not fit the classic definition of a "discrete and 
insular minority." Specifically, the Court probably believed it would have been 
difficult to contend that women are politically powerless in the majoritarian 
political process especially since Congress, in 1964, prohibited gender 
discrimination in the workplace, and because in 1972, Congress had just passed the 
Equal Rights Amendment and submitted it to the state legislatures for ratification.81 
Thus, rather than fashion a new theory of suspect class that deviates from the 
discrete and insular minority definition of a suspect class, the Court instead 
couched its analysis in terms of the dangers and irrelevancy of sex classifications, 
and made only implicit the connection between the suspectness of the classification 
with its use in treating women as an inferior class. 
If the Frontiero Court had relied on suspect class analysis to justify subjecting 
laws discriminating against women to heightened judicial scrutiny, the political 
76. 41 I U.S. 677, 685-87 (1973). 
77. Id. at 685. 
78. Id. at 687. 
79. Id. at 686. 
80. Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, I 75 (1972)). 
81. Id. at 687-88. 
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the Court decided Adarand in 1995, the Court had effectively eliminated suspect 
class analysis and instead adopted a theory ofpure suspect classifications, a theory 
that justifies heightened judicial scrutiny based solely on the suspect nature of 
certain traits or characteristics, with no reference or concern at all for politically 
vulnerable groups. Under this theory, certain traits are suspect, because there is 
something inherent in the nature of traits such as race and gender that make them 
susceptible for invidious use by the government, and not because such traits are 
used to discriminate to the peculiar disadvantage of politically vulnerable groups. 
The move to a pure suspect classification analysis began actually with the 
Court's first major affirmative action case, Regents of University of California v. 
Bakke.84 In Bakke, Justice Powell's plurality decision laid the foundation for the 
eventual elimination of suspect class analysis from equal protection law dealing 
with race. The Bakke Court was confronted with an equal protection challenge to a 
university race-conscious affirmative action program. 85 A white plaintiff challenged 
the constitutionality of a program that reserved seats in the medical school class for 
persons of disadvantaged racial groups. The threshold question the Court had to 
decide was whether it should subject the affirmative action program to strict 
scrutiny. The State argued that strict scrutiny should not apply, because the 
plaintiff challenging the law, a white man, is not a member of a "discrete and 
insular minority requiring extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process. "86 
Justice Powell rejected the State's analysis, and concluded that "[r]acial and 
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most 
exacting judicial examination,"87 even if the plaintiff challenging a racial 
classification is not a member of a discrete and insular group.88 Without using the 
language of suspect classes, Justice Powell reasoned that suspect class analysis is 
irrelevant to determining the level of scrutiny when racial or ethnic classifications 
are involved, because that rationale "has never been invoked in our decisions as a 
prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny."89 Instead, 
he reasoned that suspect class analysis is relevant only in "deciding whether or not 
to add new types of classifications to the list of "suspect" categories or whether a 
particular classification survives close examination."'90 
Thus, in Bakke, since the Court had already declared race and ethnicity to be 
suspect classifications, Powell argued that there was no need to resort to suspect 
class analysis, since that analysis is only used to determine if non-suspect 
classification ought to be treated as suspect. However, if the Court had never made 
suspect class analysis a prerequisite to subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to 
strict scrutiny, then the question arises: what was the original rationale for 
right."'). 
84. 438 U.S. 265 (I977). 
85. Id. at 269. 
86. Id. at 290. 
87. Id. at 291. 
88. Id. at 290-91. 
89. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290-91. 
90. Id. 
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responsiveness of Congress to women's interests would have undermined the 
conclusion that women as a group need extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process. The move to suspect classification analysis, 
however, made it possible for the Court to use the responsiveness of the political 
process to women's rights and interests as an argument to support rather than 
undermine the argument for heightened judicial scrutiny of sex classifications. The 
Court reasoned that because "Congress itself has concluded that classifications 
based upon sex are inherently invidious,"82 that legislative conclusion ought to be 
weighed favorably by the Court in determining if sex classifications ought to be 
treated as presumptively suspect for constitutional purposes. 
The linguistic move from talking about the class ofwomen to talking about the 
sex trait helped the Court to avoid a particularly difficult doctrinal question. By 
talking about the inherently invidious nature of the sex trait, rather than talking 
about the nature of women's political power, the Court was able to avoid having to 
engage in a complex discussion about why it should treat women as a suspect class 
even though women were seemingly furthering their interests adequately in the 
political process. 
III. THE CONSTRUCTION OF A PURE SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION ANALYSIS IN EQUAL 
PROTECTION 
In exammmg the doctrinal shifting between suspect classes to suspect 
classifications, three points need to be emphasized. First, while scholars tend to 
suggest a neat, linear doctrinal move from suspect classes to suspect classifications, 
it is more accurate to conclude that the Court has shifted back and forth between 
suspect class and suspect classification analyses, a shifting that reflects both 
linguistic confusion and doctrinal ambivalence over the central purposes of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Second, even when the Court used and emphasized the 
language of suspect classifications, they still remained committed to protecting 
suspect classes or politically vulnerable groups. Frontiero and Cleburne represent 
such cases. Third, the Court's ad-hoc use of both suspect classification and suspect 
class analysis in its earlier case law facilitated the Court's eventual move to 
eliminate the suspect class analysis from equal protection doctrine. This Part will 
explain the elimination of suspect class analysis and the emergence of the new 
equal protection ofpure suspect classifications. 
A. The New Equal Protection: The Emergence of Pure Suspect Classification 
Analysis 
As argued above, under the original theory of equal protection, heightened 
scrutiny was triggered only when two requirements were met: (1) the government 
enacted a suspect classification; and (2) that classification disadvantaged a suspect 
class, a vulnerable class or group subject to widespread hostility. 83 However, when 
82. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 687. 
83. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217-18 ("Thus we have treated as presumptively invidious those 
classifications that disadvantage a 'suspect class,' or that impinge upon the exercise of a 'fundamental 
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subjecting racial or ethnic distinctions to strict scrutiny? Justice Powell answered 
that question by asserting the inherent invidiousness of classifying on the basis of 
race. "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their 
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon a doctrine 
of equality."91 
The critical point in Powell's analysis is that he avoided having to declare 
whites a suspect class in order to conclude that challenges to affirmative action 
should be subject to strict scrutiny. Instead he emphasized that racial 
classifications are somehow universally invidious and odious. In other words, 
Justice Powell began to justify suspicion of racial classifications based on 
something inherent in nature of classifying on the basis of race. Powell's analysis 
was the opening attempt by the Court to justify strict scrutiny of racial 
classifications according to a pure suspect classification analysis instead of a 
suspect class analysis. 
Powell's opinion, however, did not command a majority of the Court, and 
therefore, his suspect classification/suspect class analysis remained dicta until the 
Court decided Croson. In Croson, the Court finally commanded a majority of the 
Court to adopt the pure suspect classification justification for subjecting racial 
classifications to strict scrutiny. The Croson Court held that race conscious 
affirmative action programs or benign racial classifications enacted by state and 
local governments must be subject to strict scrutiny.92 
In reaching its holding, the Court rejected suspect class/discrete and insular 
minority analysis and instead justified strict scrutiny of all racial classifications on 
the basis of the special nature of the trait race. The Court concluded that "the 
standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race 
of those burdened or benefited by a particular classification."93 Unlike in decisions 
like Frontiero and Cleburne, the Court used the language of suspect classifications 
without any direct and in-depth reference to the political strength or weakness of 
the class challenging a discriminatory law. The Court reasoned that persons of all 
races, even those who do not belong to a discrete and insular racial minority group, 
deserve the fullest protection of their "equal dignity and respect. "94 In other words, 
for the Court, there is something inherent in the act of making distinctions on the 
basis of race that denies to persons of all races their equal dignity and respect. 
The move to a theory of pure suspect classifications was completed in the 
Court's decision in Adarand. In that case, the Court extended the holding of 
Croson and declared that when a white plaintiff challenges a federal law for 
violating his or her right to equal protection, all federal law disadvantaging whites 
on the basis of race must also be subject to strict scrutiny.95 The Court asserted, 
"[A ]ny person, of whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental 
91. Id. at 290-91 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)). 
92. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
93. Id. at 494. However, the Court also claimed that whites in Croson were a suspect class, because 
a black- controlled Richmond City Council enacted a law disadvantaging the white minority in 
Richmond. See id. at 495-96. 
94. Id. at 493. 
95. Adarand, 515 U.S., at 237-38. 
602 TEMPLE POLITICAL & CIVIL RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:583 
actor subject to the Constitution justify any racial classification subjecting that 
person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny. "96 In justifying its 
decision to subject all racial classifications to strict scrutiny, the Court emphasized 
that a person always "suffers an injury when he or she is disadvantaged by the 
government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be."97 
Thus, as in Croson, the Court in Adarand discussed the inherently harmful 
nature of racial classifications, contending that the act of classifying on the basis of 
race itself automatically creates a dignitary or stigmatic harm, since it is using a 
presumptively irrelevant trait in order to harm individual members of a racial 
group.98 Furthermore, in emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause protects 
persons and not groups, the Court is also rejecting the notion that a person's rights 
under equal protection depends on whether he or she belongs to a politically 
powerless group.99 
B. Implications of the New Equal Protection Doctrine of Pure Suspect 
Classifications 
There are several important points that arise from the emergence of the new 
equal protection. In Croson and Adarand, the Court accomplished one of two 
things: it (1) eliminated the suspect class prong of equal protection analysis, and 
declaring now that suspect classifications trigger strict scrutiny, it no longer 
mattered whether the classification was burdening a protected group or not; or (2) it 
declared that whites are a suspect class. 
The first implication of the Court's adoption of the pure suspect classification 
analysis in Croson and Adarand is that the Court has effectively eliminated suspect 
class analysis from equal protection law. In concluding that the suspectness of a 
classification like race derives from the special nature of a trait like race, the Court 
has basically rendered suspect class analysis irrelevant. 
Moreover, the elimination of suspect class analysis suggests that the Court 
believes that racial minorities are no longer suspect classes deserving of special 
protection from the political process. Rather, the implication is that now, in the 
post-civil rights era, all racial groups stand on equal footing in the political process, 
and now the Court simply needs to use !he equal protection clause to ensure that the 
state does not foster racial hostility and racial balkanization between equal racial 
groups. Therefore, the Court will strictly scrutinize all racial classifications without 
regard to whether the racial group being burdened is a suspect class or not, in order 
to prevent racial groups from engaging in racial politics.100 
The second implication of the pure suspect classification analysis is that Court 
has effectively held that whites constitute a suspect class. By holding that laws that 
96. Id. at 224. 
97. Id. at 230. 
98. See id. at 229 (use of racial classifications, even for benign purposes, can only "delay the time 
when race will become a truly irrelevant, or at least insignificant, factor"). 
99. See id. at 227. 
100. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (reasoning that use of racial classifications may "lead to a politics 
of racial hostility"). 
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burden whites must be subject to strict scrutiny, the Court is g1vmg whites 
extraordinary judicial protection from the majoritarian political process, the sort of 
judicial protection that had been ordinarily reserved for politically powerless 
groups. Arguably, therefore, in Croson and Adarand, the Court has effectively 
held that whites as a group now meet the "traditional indicia of suspectness,"101 
because whites are a class saddled with disabilities, have been subject to a history 
of unequal treatment, and have been relegated to pos1tlons of political 
powerlessness as to command extraordinary attention from the majoritarian 
political process. 
However, since it would have been extremely difficult from both a substantive 
and rhetorical standpoint to explicitly declare whites as a suspect class, 102 the Court 
justified extraordinary judicial protection of white interests by resorting to an 
analysis which rendered suspect class analysis irrelevant. By emphasizing the 
inherent harm of classifying on the basis of race, the Court was able to avoid 
having to explicitly conclude what it did implicitly: declare whites as a suspect 
class. In other words, using suspect classification language instead of suspect class 
language was a way to change the subject away from a discussion of the political 
strengths and weaknesses of whites as a political group to a discussion of the 
inherent harms of racial classifications, benign or otherwise. 
Either way, the Court has dramatically transformed equal protection doctrine 
with respect to issues dealing with racism and racial subordination, and it has never 
had to deal with the hard doctrinal questions in making this move. Instead, in part 
because of the looseness with which we use the terms "class" and "classification," 
the Court was able to contend that what they did in Croson and Adarand was fully 
consistent with prior equal protection case-law, emphasizing that the blackletter 
law of equal protection is that "race" is a suspect classification, period, regardless 
of whether the classification harms a suspect class or not. The Court, however, 
never had to explicitly hold that it was either eliminating the suspect class analysis 
of equal protection jurisprudence, or that it was explicitly holding that whites are 
now a suspect class. 
IV. A CRITICAL LINGUISTIC EXAMINATION OF SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION DOCTRINE 
This Part contends that the language structure of suspect classification 
doctrine played a large role in the emergence of the new equal protection doctrine, 
and a critical linguistic analysis of the doctrine can help to show linguistically how 
transformation occurred. This Part will explain critical linguistic methodology and 
then examine the linguistic implications of the Court's shift from class to 
classifications analysis. 
A. Critical Linguistics 
First, before this Part examines the linguistic implications of the Court's move 
101. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
I 02. See ELY, supra note 16, at 170 (arguing that whites do not need special judicial protection 
because they are capable of protecting their own interests in the political process). 
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to a pure suspect classification analysis, it is necessary to briefly describe a field of 
linguistics called critical or meta-linguistics. The theory of "metalinguistics" was 
first developed by linguist Benjamin Lee Whorf to describe a loosely defined field 
of linguistics concerned with the relationship between language, thought, and the 
social construction of reality. 103 The fundamental premise underlying a 
metalinguistic approach to the study of language is that "the structure of a human 
being's language influences the manner in which he understands reality and 
behaves with respect to it." 104 Metalinguistics studies how language patterns 
structure and direct our attention to selective portions of our environment, and how 
we react to those selected portions of our environment. 105 
Language structure reflects and embodies a metaphysical view of the world 
and the nature of reality. 106 Therefore, changing or transforming the structure of 
language also means changing or transforming the underlying view of reality. 107 
The English language structure embodies and reproduces an Aristotelian 
essentialist understanding of reality. 108 The English language structure is premised 
on the rules of Aristotelian logic, a logic based on Aristotelian essentialism, which 
is the view that there is an essential or ultimate nature of things, that things have 
"real" qualities in them. 109 
Essentialism is a static view of reality and the world. 110 If a thing has an 
essence or property by virtue of its essential nature, then under an essentialist view, 
that thing will always possess that particular property or essence. 111 On the other 
hand, an anti-essentialist approach to language takes a process-oriented approach to 
understanding reality. 112 It presumes that there is no "objective or essential" reality 
as is presumed under an Aristotelian metaphysics; instead, it presumes that 
"reality" is socially constructed through an interaction between subject and 
object. 113 This approach to language presumes that words and categories are not 
"objective," but rather, are subjective, culturally contingent constructs that reflect, 
shape, and direct our focus and attention. 114 
103. BENJAMIN LEE WHORF, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND REALITY 23, 59 (John B. Carrol ed., 
M.l.T. Press 1964) (1956). 
104. Id. at 23. 
105. ANATOL RAPOPORT, OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY: INTEGRATING KNOWLEDGE AND ACTION 235 
(1969). 
106. See, e.g., RICHARD BANDLER & JOHN GRINDER, THE STRUCTURE OF MAGIC: A BOOK ABOUT 
LANGUAGE AND THERAPY 21-22 (1975) (stating that humans use language to represent and model 
experience); WENDELL JOHNSON, PEOPLE IN QUANDARIES: THE SEMANTICS OF PERSONAL 
ADJUSTMENT 112-42 (1946) ("The relationship between language and reality is a strnctural 
relationship."). See generally S.I. HAYAKAWA, LANGUAGE IN THOUGHT AND ACTION 156 ( 1978) ("But 
as we know from everyday experience, learning language is not simply a matter of learning words; it is a 
matter of correctly relating our words to the things and happenings for which they stand."). 
107. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 28. 

I08. Id. at 7. 

109. Id. at6-10. 
110. Id. at 83. 

Ill. Id. at 121-22. 

112. Id. at 83. 
113. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 144-45. 
114. Id. 
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There are two key premises to a meta-linguistic analysis of language and law. 
One premise is the principle of non-identity, which boils down to the statement that 
"A is not A."115 In other words, the premise of non-identity states that there is a 
fundamental difference between a word and the object represented by a word, and 
that there is a fundamental difference between similar words or statements stated at 
different levels of abstraction. 116 For example, with respect to the difference 
between a word and the object, we clearly understand that the word "hamburger" is 
something entirely different from the object "hamburger."117 Thus, we do not eat a 
menu with the word hamburger printed on it because we know that would not be 
the same thing as actually taking a bite of a type of food we call a hamburger. 118 
The second key premise is that there is a fundamental difference between 
words and statements stated at different levels of abstraction. 119 As Wendell 
Johnson notes: 
Truth is not truth (A is not A), for example, in the sense that what 
truth refers to on one level of abstraction is not identical with that 
to which it refers on some other level. To put it in homely terms, a 
theoretical statement about hamburger is not the same as the label 
hamburger, which in turn is not the same as hamburger you stick a 
fork into and put in your mouth, which again is not the same as 
hamburger acted upon by your digestive juices and assimilated into 
120 
your body-
In other words, in a debate, when a person uses language in such a way to 
change the level of abstraction upon which debate occurs, that person is in effect 
changing the subject matter, even if we may not realize it. Another homely 
example may help to explain the implications of shifting a discussion from one 
level to another level of abstraction. 
Assume two people are discussing a movie, and they are talking about a 
particular scene. They describe the scene to each other and both state that the scene 
was humorous. Then, one person asks why the other person found the scene funny, 
and that person goes on to explain that she enjoys physical, slapstick humor for the 
way such humor takes a surreal view of reality, which helps her to forget the 
routines of every day life. Once the discussion moved from a discussion describing 
a funny movie scene to a discussion about why that scene was humorous, the 
discussion moved to a higher level of abstraction. Even though they may still be 
referring to the same movie scene, now they are having a substantively different 
conversation, because the two discussants are no longer talking about the humorous 
movie scene, instead they are examining their own general personal tastes 
regarding humor. 
115. Id. at 171-72. 
116. Id. at 177. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. 
119. JOHNSON, supra note 74, at 177. 
120. Id. 
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Just as everyday discussions and debates shift constantly between different 
levels of abstraction, legal discourse also shifts constantly between different levels 
of abstraction. A critical linguistic analysis of law is an analysis that focuses on 
being conscious of how courts and lawyers uses linguistic techniques to subtly 
change the subject matter of a legal discussion, and of how such linguistic moves 
have both substantive and rhetorical effect on shaping legal discourse. 121 
Meta-linguist Wendell Johnson provides two simple ways to determine the 
level of abstraction a discussion is operating on. First, [a] practical test of the 
relative level of abstraction on which we are speaking at any given moment lies 
simply in the amount of time (or number of words) required to make reasonably 
clear what we are talking about."122 Second, another test of the relative abstraction 
of a particular discourse is the extent to which the discourse leaves out descriptive 
details. 123 As discourse moves toward higher levels of generality or abstraction, 
more and more details are left out. 
Thus, a critical linguistic analysis of law is an analysis which focuses on how 
changes in language structure and word choice can affect the level of abstraction at 
which discourse occurs. 124 Moreover, as stated above, the structure of our language 
actually reflects and reinforces epistemological and metaphysical premises and 
assumptions. A critical linguistic analysis of law, therefore, contends that scholars 
should focus on the language structure of such legal concepts as "suspect 
classifications" or "suspect classes" in order to better understand the nature of legal 
debates and discourse by (I) being conscious of the process of abstraction; by (2) 
uncovering the underlying epistemology or view of reality embedded within the 
language structure of a particular doctrine; and by (3) understanding how invisible 
linguistic techniques can and have been used for rhetorical purposes. 
B. Examining the Essentialist Language Structure ofSuspect Classification 
Doctrine 
In part, the language structure of suspect classification analysis made it 
possible for the Court to develop a suspect classification analysis without any 
reference at all to suspect or vulnerable groups. By shifting the discussion from 
suspect classes to suspect classifications, the Court moved the doctrine to a higher 
level of abstraction, and subsequently changed the substance of equal protection 
doctrine. 
From a linguistic standpoint, the doctrinal shift from classes to classifications 
constitutes a shift higher up the ladder of abstraction. A discussion of suspect traits 
(classifications) is at a higher level of abstraction then a discussion about groups of 
people (classes), because a discussion of traits leaves out greater detail than a 
discussion of classes of people. Specifically, instead of talking about all the 
various aspects of a group like African Americans (race, history of discrimination, 
political power), a discussion of traits focuses on only one particular aspect of that 
121. See id. at 121-22 (analyzing the language structure of the statement "John is smart"). 
122. Id. at 140. 
123. See id. at 128 (describing the abstracting process as the process of leaving out details). 
124. Id. 
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group (race). 
Furthermore, the linguistic structure of the term suspect classifications then 
directs discussion even further up the ladder of abstraction, and the term tends to 
create essentialist discourse about the essence or true nature of a particular trait. 
The term is one in which the adjective "suspect" modifies the nominalized noun 
"classification." In other words, the term suspect classification is another way of 
saying "a classification is suspect," i.e., that this thing called a classification 
possesses this attribute or quality called "suspectness." The linguistic structure of 
the term "suspect classification" implies that there are these things called 
"classifications" which possess the attributes of "suspectness." If that is the case, 
to figure out why a classification like race is suspect, then what lawyers and 
scholars need to do is to figure out the nature of traits like height, weight, sexual 
orientation, and wealth to determine if they possess the same attributes of 
suspectness as race. 
Thus, when determining why a classificatory trait like race is suspect and 
therefore any legislation relying on a racial classification should be subject to strict 
scrutiny, the legal discourse turns inexorably to the nature of the trait race. As 
Professor Rubin asserts, "Racial classifications of course form the paradigmatic 
case for strict scrutiny. And, since not all classifications trigger strict scrutiny, 
there must be something about the character of race that renders it different for 
equal protection purposes from other characteristics."125 Once we begin to talk 
about the nature of a thing like race, then we are engaging in Aristotelian 
essentialist discourse trying to figure out the true essence of things. 
The underlying language structure and usage of the term "suspect 
classification," therefore, reflects an Aristotelian view of reality in which the world 
consists of things possessing certain qualities or properties. We ask questions 
about the nature of race assuming that there are some essential attributes about race 
that make it constitutionally suspect. That is exactly what the courts and scholars 
have done, they have asked questions like: what is race?126 Is race a genetic or 
biological trait?127 Is race a social construction?128 
Thus, when discussion focuses on "race," the topic inexorably moves to 
discussions about the true nature of "race." Accordingly, legal discourse focuses 
on whether race is a biological trait or whether race is a social construction. In 
specific doctrinal terms, shifting the discussion from suspect class to suspect 
classifications means a focus on issues like "immutability." Thus, for example, to 
determine whether a classification ought to be deemed "suspect," factors the Court 
has examined is whether the trait in question is "immutable,"129 and whether it is a 
125. Rubin, supra note 27, at 15 (emphasis added). 
126. See, e.g., D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self, 82 
GEO. L.J. 437, 442 (1993) (discussing the contradictory meanings of the concept of"race"). 
127. See generally Donald Braman, OfRace and Immutability, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1375, 1424 (1999) 
(discussing biological theories of race). 
128. See, e.g., Ian Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on 11/usion, 
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. I, 62 (1994) (arguing that race is a social 
construct and not an inescapable physical fact). 
129. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (discussing the immutable nature of 
the gender characteristic). 
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trait that a person is born with and bears no responsibility for. 130 
As the Court in Frontiero concluded, sex/gender should be considered suspect 
because of its special nature. "[S]ex ... is an immutable characteristic determined 
solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the 
members of a particular sex seem to violate the basic concept of our system that 
legal burdens should bear some responsibility to individual responsibility."131 
However, the Frontiero Court's rationale is one that need not and does not refer to 
the effects of classifying on the basis of a trait like gender on a particular 
vulnerable class (women). The Court's rationale is universalistic, in the sense that 
its reasoning justified a prohibition on all forms of gender discrimination, whether 
it is against men or women. Men, just like women, bear an immutable 
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth (maleness), and therefore, 
under a pure suspect classification analysis, they also should not be discriminated 
against on the basis of their gender. 132 
The key in understanding the application of pure suspect classification 
analysis to realize that all those questions about the nature of suspect traits can be 
posed and answered without ever having to discuss the relationship between those 
questions about the nature and quality of "race" or "gender" and the relationship of 
those traits to the classes of people they define. Specifically, because the 
underlying language structure of the term orients discussion of that term towards a 
high level of abstraction, the Court was able to construct its pure suspect 
classification discourse in which the suspectness of the classification derived from 
the intrinsic nature of the classification itself. That focus on the essential nature of 
traits has led to an analysis that is completely divorced from the concerns about the 
actual, material realities of people who continue to suffer from long standing 
subordination and political isolation. 
The suspect classification analysis, therefore, without any reference to suspect 
classes, produces a more static, highly abstract legal discourse, a discourse that 
ultimately tends to produce an ahistorical, decontextualized, universal justification 
for explaining why certain traits should be deemed suspect classifications. In other 
words, implicit in analysis focused exclusively on creating criteria about suspect 
classifications by looking solely at the nature of the classification tends to gravitate 
towards an analysis entirely divorced from historical and geographical 
circumstances, and the historical legacy and impetus behind the promulgation of 
the equal protection doctrine ends up as a legally irrelevant backdrop. 
C. The Role ofLanguage in Legitimating Doctrinal Change 
As Professor Rubenfeld astutely points out, the transformation from a strict 
scrutiny doctrine incorporating both suspect classification and protected group 
analysis to a doctrine of merely suspect classification analysis has largely gone 
I 30. Id. at 686. 
I31. Id. 
I32. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding laws that discriminate against men must be 
subject to heightened judicial scrutiny). 
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unnoticed by constitutional scholars, lawyers, and judges. 133 The reason why this 
momentous move has gone unnoticed is because of the linguistic confusion in the 
interchangeable and ad hoc use of the two very similar terms, suspect 
classifications and suspect classes. 
It is crucial to understand that the doctrinal move from suspect 
classification/suspect class to suspect classification is also a change in the linguistic 
structure of the equal protection doctrine. There is a reason why the Court's 
heightened scrutiny of affirmative action programs went hand in hand with the 
linguistic move from suspect classes to suspect classifications. For three reasons, it 
is much easier to justify heightened judicial scrutiny of race conscious affirmative 
action programs if you rely on "suspect classification" doctrine as opposed to 
doctrine incorporating both suspect classification and suspect class analyses. 
First, a suspect classification analysis fits within a theory of equal protection 
that focuses on the protection of individual rights as opposed to group rights. 
Because a classification or trait is something that all individuals possess, such as 
race or gender, if the court concludes that "race" is a suspect classification, then 
logically, whether you are classified as white or black, it does not matter, the act of 
being classified on the basis ofrace is considered constitutionally suspicious. 
Second, the linguistic confusion and conflation of the terms "suspect 
classification" and "suspect class" permitted the current Supreme Court to make 
dramatic changes in equal protection law while simultaneously being able to claim 
that what they were doing was fully consistent with prior case law.134 Because 
lawyers and constitutional scholars consistently referred to a strict scrutiny doctrine 
of suspect classifications disadvantaging suspect classes solely by the term "suspect 
classification" doctrine, it made the Court's move in dropping the "suspect class" 
aspect of the doctrine that much easier. It simply focused on precedent discussing 
the dangers and suspectness of certain "classifications," and then concluded that 
was all prior case law was concerned with. That simple linguistic move allowed 
the Court to make the dramatic move to impose heightened scrutiny on so called 
"benign racial classifications," concluding that it must treat race conscious 
affirmative action programs in the same way as it treated Jim Crow segregation 
laws,135 because dangers inhered in the simple use of racial classifications, 
regardless of the intended purpose. 136 In making this move, the Court hardly 
mentioned that it had dropped the aspect of strict scrutiny doctrine that presupposed 
heightened scrutiny only when a suspect classification was putatively 
disadvantaging a "suspect class" subject to widespread hostility and prejudice. 137 
133. Rubenfeld. supra note 5, at 301. 
134. See id. at 516-17 (citing to Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 
200 (holding that even benign racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny and effectively 
overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) only to the extent that it was 
inconsistent with this holding). 
135. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 223 (arguing that racial classifications are inherently suspect). 
136. Id. at 230 ("Consistency does recognize that any individual suffers an injury when he or she is 
disadvantaged by the government because of his or her race, whatever that race may be.") (emphasis in 
original). 
13 7. See id. at 229-30 ("The principle of consistency simply means that whenever the government 
treats any person unequally because of his or her race, that person has suffered an injury that falls 
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Third, under a suspect classification analysis, it is easier to presume the 
existence of equality rather than the existence of inequality. The focus on 
classifications presumes a formal equality between people and considers irrelevant 
any real socioeconomic inequality between people. This is because the focus is not 
on historically situated conditions affecting different racial groups in society, but 
rather, on the trait and universally felt effects of classifying on the basis of that 
trait. 
On the other hand, it is much harder to justify heightened judicial scrutiny of 
race conscious affirmative action programs if the equal protection doctrine is based 
on a theory of the need to protect certain suspect classes or groups. Under a theory 
of suspect classes, to determine if heightened scrutiny should be imposed on 
affirmative action programs discriminating against whites, it would first be 
necessary to determine if whites are a suspect class (e.g., saddled with disabilities, 
historically discriminated against, a powerless political minority). 
Clearing up the linguistic confusion would have forced the Court to be much 
more explicit about the dramatic changes it made in equal protection doctrine, and 
perhaps may have changed the votes of certain swing Justices. Linguistic clarity 
would also sharpen the debate regarding affirmative action and equal protection, 
and expose the dramatic intervention into legislative affairs under current equal 
protection doctrine that would have hardly been justifiable several decades ago. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article was to engage in a critical linguistic analysis of 
equal protection doctrine to show how language structure played a crucial role in 
shaping the evolution of the law from Brown to Adarand. This Article is part of a 
larger project engaging in a critical linguistic analysis of the law, arguing that 
lawyers and legal scholars should be more conscious of the fact that words and 
concepts operate at multiple levels of abstraction, and understanding how those 
levels of abstraction influence and shape substantive legal discourse. 
squarely within the language and spirit of [the Equal Protection Clause]. It says nothing about the 
ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying strict 
scrutiny"); Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 ("We thus reaffirm the view expressed by the plurality in [Wygant v. 
Jackon Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 279-80 (1986)] that the standard of review under the Equal 
Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular 
classification."). 
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